The Art of War Book Quotes With Page Numbers

SOME JUICY QUOTATIONS FROM CLAUSEWITZ, ON War

These quotations are taken from the Michael Howard/Peter Paret translation, Princeton Academy Press, 1976/84, which is based on the original in German, Vom Kriege, Dummlers Verlag, Berlin, 1832.) This is the standard, though not the best, English translation. (Which translation practice you have?)

We have long resisted posting a page like this, because Clausewitz's comments are routinely taken out of context and sometimes desperately misused. But and so we decided, what the hell, why not? The prepare of quotations below—collected past then-National War College professor Lani Kass—has a certain continuity and conveys a better sense of the whole than about we have seen.

Here's a link to some other brusk set of Clausewitz quotations, collected past Brainy Quote.

Pp 127-47. (Page references are to the Howard/Paret translation, Princeton edition.)

• War is fighting and operates in a peculiar chemical element—danger.  Just war is served by many activities quite different from information technology, all of which business concern the maintenance of the fighting forces.  These preparatory activities are excluded from the narrower pregnant of the art of war—the bodily conduct of war, because they are concerned but with the cosmos, grooming, and maintenance of the fighting forces.  "The theory of war proper, on the other hand, is concerned with the use of these means, once they have been developed, for the purposes of the war."

• "Tactics teaches the use of armed services in the date; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war."

• "In tactics the means are the fighting forces . . . the finish is victory."  "The original means of strategy is victory—that is, tactical success; its ends . . . are those objects which will pb direct to peace."  Strategy . . . confers a special significance . . . on the date: it assigns a detail aim to it."

• The activities characteristic of war may be split into two chief categories: those that are merely preparations for war, and war proper.

• Earlier theorists aimed to equip the conduct of war with principles, rules, or even systems, and thus considered only factors that could be mathematically calculated (e.g., numerical superiority; supply; the base; interior lines).  All these attempts are objectionable, nevertheless, because they aim at fixed values. In war everything is uncertain and variable, intertwined with psychological forces and effects, and the product of a continuous interaction of opposites.

• Theory becomes infinitely more difficult as presently every bit information technology touches the realm of moral values.

• Thus it is easier to use theory to organize, plan, and behave an date than information technology is to use it in determining the engagement's purpose.

• Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it volition calorie-free his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls.

• "Theory need not be a positive doctrine, a sort of transmission for action. . . .  It is an belittling investigation leading to a close associate with the subject."

Pp 226-229.

• "Fighting is the central military machine act. . . .  Engagements hateful fighting.  The object of fighting is the destruction or defeat of the enemy."

• "What do we mean by the defeat of the enemy?  Simply the devastation of his forces, whether past expiry, injury, or whatever other means—either completely  or enough to make him stop fighting. . . .  The consummate or partial destruction of the enemy must be regarded equally the sole object of all engagements. . . .  Direct annihilation of the enemy's forces must ever be the ascendant consideration."

 Pp 357-359.

• Although the concept of defense is parrying a blow and its characteristic feature is awaiting the accident,  "if nosotros are really waging state of war, nosotros must return the enemy's blows. . . .  Thus a defensive entrada tin can be fought with offensive battles. . .   "The defensive form of war is non a simple shield, merely a shield made upwards of well-directed blows."

• The object of defense is preservation; and since it is easier to hold footing than to take it, defense is easier than assault.  "But defense has a passive purpose: preservation; and assault a positive one: conquest. . . .  If defense is the stronger form of war, nonetheless has a negative object, if follows that information technology should be used only so long every bit weakness compels, and be abased as soon as nosotros are potent plenty to pursue a positive object."

• Defence is the stronger form of waging war.

 Pp 69-seventy.

• Equally of ten Jul 1827, Clausewitz regarded the get-go half-dozen books "just as a rather formless mass that must be thoroughly reworked over again."  The revision would aim to bring out the two kinds of war more than conspicuously:  get-go, war that aimed to "overthrow the enemy;" and second, war that aimed "merely to occupy some of his frontier districts."  He also aimed to make clear the point that "state of war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means."

• Equally of 1830, Clausewitz nevertheless regarded his manuscript "as naught but a collection of materials from which a theory of war was to have been distilled. . .  The showtime chapter of Book I lonely I regard as finished.  It will at least serve the whole by indicating the management I meant to follow everywhere."

 Pp 488-489.

• In the defense of a theater, "the importance of possessing the country increases, the less a decision is actively sought by the belligerents."  When the war is governed by the urge for a determination, even so, "such a decision may be fabricated up of a unmarried boxing or a serial of major engagements."  This likelihood "should exist enough to call for the utmost possible concentration of forcefulness. . . .  A major battle in a theater of operations is a collision between 2 centers of gravity; the more forces we can concentrate in our center of gravity, the more certain and massive the consequence will be."

 Pp 577-627.

• "No one starts a state of war--or rather, no one in his senses ought to exercise and then--without offset being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve past that war and how he intends to conduct it." (Makes a similar argument in Book 1, Chapter 1)

• "The natural aim of military operations is the enemy's overthrow. . . . Since both belligerents concur that view, it would follow that military operations could not be suspended . . . until one or other side were finally defeated."  Just that theoretical concept is not borne out in practise because of a "vast assortment of factors, forces, and conditions in national affairs that are affected by war."

• "The degree of strength that must exist used against the enemy depends on the scale of political demands on either side. . . .  Simply they seldom are fully known.  Since in state of war too small an endeavour tin result not just in failure, but in positive harm, each side is driven to outdo the other, which sets up an interaction."

• The aim of war should be the defeat of the enemy.  But what constitutes defeat?  The conquest of his whole territory is not e'er necessary, and total occupation of his territory may not exist enough.

• Out of the dominant characteristics of both belligerents "a certain eye of gravity develops, the hub of all power and motility, on which everything depends.  That is the betoken against which all our energies should be directed."

• "The acts nosotros consider nigh of import for the defeat of the enemy are . . .

  – Destruction of his army, if it is at all significant

  – Seizure of his majuscule if it is not only the center of administration but also that of social, professional person, and political activeness

  – Delivery of an effective blow against his principal ally if that ally is more powerful than he."

• "Time . . . is less likely to bring favor to the victor than to the vanquished. . .  An offensive war requires above all a quick, irresistible decision. . . .  Any kind of break, break, or break of activity is inconsistent with the nature of offensive war."

• "A defender must always seek to change over to the assault as before long as he has gained the do good of the defense."

• "The defeat of the enemy . . . . presuppose[s] great concrete or moral superiority or else an extremely enterprising spirit. . . .  When neither of these is present, the object of military activity can simply be ane of two kinds:  seizing a small or larger piece of enemy territory, or holding one'south own until things take a better plough."  Thus "two kinds of limited war are possible:  offensive war with a express aim, and defensive war."

• "It is of course well known that the but source of war is politics—the intercourse of governments and peoples. . . .  We maintain . . . that war is just a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other ways.

• "If war is part of policy, policy will make up one's mind its character.  As policy becomes more than ambitious and vigorous, so volition war, and this may reach the point where war attains its absolute class. . . .  Policy is the guiding intelligence and state of war merely the musical instrument, non vice versa."

• "No major proposal required for war tin be worked out in ignorance of political factors. . . . [Likewise,] if state of war is to be fully consonant with political objectives, and policy suited to the means bachelor for state of war, . . . the only audio expedient is to make the commander-in-chief a member of the cabinet."

• In limited war, we can attain a positive aim by seizing and occupying a function of the enemy's territory.  However, this endeavor is burdened with the defence force of other points non covered by our limited offensive.  Oftentimes the price of this additional defense negates or even outweighs the advantages of our express offensive.

• We tin also undertake a limited defensive war, of which there are two distinct kinds.  In the commencement, we aim to keep our territory inviolate and concur information technology as long as possible, hoping time will modify the external situation and relieve the pressure confronting us.  In the second, we adopt the defensive to help create the weather for a counteroffensive and the pursuit of a positive aim.

• "Two basic principles . . . underlie all strategic planning. . . .

   – The get-go principle is:  act with the utmost concentration [trace the ultimate substance of enemy strength to the fewest possible sources; compress the attack on these sources to the fewest possible actions; and subordinate minor actions equally much as possible].

   – The second principle is:  act with the utmost speed [every unnecessary expenditure of fourth dimension and every unnecessary detour is a waste of force; take the shortest possible route to the goal]."

   – The commencement task, then, in planning for a war is to identify the enemy's heart of gravity, and if possible trace information technology dorsum to unmarried i.

   – The second task is to ensure that the forces to be used confronting that point are concentrated for a master offensive.

 Pp 75-89.

• "War is . . . an deed of force to compel our enemy to do our will."

• Considering war is an deed of forcefulness, committed against a living, reacting opponent, it produces three interactions that, in theory, lead to iii extremes:  maximum use of forcefulness; full disarmament of the enemy; and maximum exertion of force.

    – However, state of war never achieves its accented nature because:  "war is never an isolated act;" "state of war does not consist of a single brusque blow;" and "in state of war the consequence is never final."

    – "One time the farthermost is no longer feared or aimed at, it becomes a matter of judgment what degree of try should be made; and this can only be based on . . . the laws of probability."

    – "War is also interrupted (or moderated), and thus fabricated fifty-fifty more than a gamble, by:  the superiority of defence force over criminal offence; imperfect knowledge of the situation; and the element of chance."

• "As this police force [of extremes] begins to lose its force and every bit this determination wanes, the political aim will reassert itself. . . .  The political object —the original motive for the war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort information technology requires."

    – "War is not a mere act of policy simply a true political musical instrument, a continuation of political activity past other means."

    – "The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war . . . the closer volition state of war arroyo its abstruse concept. . . .  The less intense the motives, the less volition the military element'due south natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives."

    – "The outset, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to constitute . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking."

• "Every bit a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies e'er make war a remarkable trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity . . . of the play of adventure and probability . . . and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy."

Pp.ninety-123.

"If  . . . we consider the pure concept of war . . . . its aim would have always and solely to be to overcome the enemy and disarm him."  This encompasses "three wide objectives, which between them cover everything:  destroying the enemy'due south armed services; occupying his country; and breaking his will to keep the struggle.

"But the aim of disarming the enemy (the object of war in the abstract . . .) is in fact not always encountered in reality, and demand not exist fully achieved as a status of peace."

"Inability to carry on the struggle can, in practice, exist replaced by 2 other grounds for making peace:  the beginning is the improbability of victory; the second is its unacceptable cost."

We may demonstrate to the enemy the improbability of his victory by:  obtaining a single victory; by seizing a province; or by conducting operations to produce direct political repercussions.

We may demonstrate to the enemy the unacceptable cost of his struggle by:  invading his territory; conducting operations to increase his suffering; or by wearing down the enemy.

There is only one means in war:  combat.

"Whenever armed forces . . . are used, the idea of combat must exist present. . . .  The cease for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is just that he should fight at the right place and the right time."

"If the thought of fighting underlies every utilise of the fighting forces, then their employment means simply the planning and organizing of a series of engagements. . .  The destruction of the enemy's forces is always the means by which the purpose of the appointment is achieved."

"When one forcefulness is a great bargain stronger than the other, an estimate may be enough.  There will exist no fighting:  the weaker side will yield at once. . . Fifty-fifty if no actual fighting occurs . . . the outcome rests on the assumption that if it came to fighting, the enemy would be destroyed."

"When we speak of destroying the enemy's forces nosotros must emphasize that zero obliges u.s.a. to limit this idea to concrete forces:  the moral element must likewise be considered."

"Destruction of the enemy forces is always the superior, more effective ways, with which others cannot compete. . . .  The commander who wishes to adopt different ways tin can reasonably do and so only if he assumes his opponent to be as unwilling to resort to major battles."

"Genius refers to a very highly adult mental aptitude for a particular occupation. . . .  The essence of military machine genius . . . . consists in a harmonious combination of elements."

"War is the realm of danger; therefore courage is the soldier's first requirement"

"State of war is the realm of physical exertion and suffering. . . .  Nascence or training must provide united states of america with a certain strength of body and soul."

"Nosotros come at present to the region dominated by the powers of intellect.  State of war is the realm of uncertainty . . . .  War is the realm of gamble. . . .  Two qualities are indispensable:  start, an intellect that, even in the darkest 60 minutes, retains some glimmerings of the inner low-cal which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever information technology may pb.  The outset of these qualities is described by the French term, insurrection d'oeil; the second is determination."

State of war'south climate of danger, exertion, dubiousness, and chance also demands other intellectual qualities.

"Presence of mind . . . is goose egg merely an increased capacity of dealing with the unexpected."

"Energy in action varies in proportion to the forcefulness of its motive."  Of all the passions none is more powerful than appetite.

"Staunchness indicates the will'southward resistance to a single blow; endurance refers to prolonged resistance."

"Strength of mind or of graphic symbol" is "the power to continue one'southward head at times of exceptional stress and violent emotion."

"Firmness cannot evidence itself, of course, if a man keeps changing his mind."  It demands sticking to one'southward convictions.

The relationship betwixt warfare and terrain demands "the faculty of rapidly and accurately grasping the topography of whatever area."

"If we then ask what sort of mind is likeliest to display the qualities of military genius . . . it is the inquiring rather than the artistic listen, the comprehensive rather than the specialized approach, the calm rather than the excitable head."

"We have identified danger, physical exertion, intelligence, and friction as the elements that coalesce to form the atmosphere of war, and turn it into a medium that impedes activity."

"The novice cannot pass through these layers of increasing intensity of danger without sensing that here ideas are governed by other factors, that the light of reason is refracted in a quite dissimilar from that which is normal in bookish speculation."

"If no one had the correct to give his views on military operations except when he is frozen, or faint from heat and thirst, or depressed from privation and fatigue, objective and authentic views would be even rarer than they are."

"Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are fake, and well-nigh are uncertain."

"Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.  The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction. . . .  This tremendous friction . . . is everywhere in contact with chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured, only considering they are largely due to gamble. . . .  Moreover, every war is rich in unique episodes."

"The good general must know friction in social club to overcome information technology whenever possible, and in order not to wait a standard of achievement in his operations which this very friction makes impossible."

"Is there any lubricant that will reduce this chafe?  Only ane . . . combat experience."

Pp 177-204.

"Strategy is the employ of the engagement for the purpose of the war.  The strategist must therefore define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accord with its purpose. . . .  The aim will determine the series of deportment intended to achieve it."

"Results are of two kinds:  direct and indirect. . . .  The possession of provinces, cities, fortresses, roads, bridges, munitions dumps, etc., may be the immediate object of an engagement, but can never be the terminal ane."

"If we practice non learn to regard a war, and the separate campaigns of which information technology is composed, every bit a chain of linked engagements each leading to the next, only instead succumb to the thought that the capture of certain geographical points or the seizure of undefended provinces are of value in themselves, nosotros are liable to regard them every bit windfall profits."

"The strategic elements that affect the use of engagements may be classified into diverse types:  moral, physical, mathematical, geographical, and statistical."

The moral elements [everything that is created past intellectual and psychological qualities and influences] are among the most important in state of war.  Unfortunately, they volition not yield to academic wisdom.  They cannot be classified or counted. . . .  The furnishings of physical and psychological factors form an organic whole.   In formulating any rule concerning concrete factors, the theorist must bear in listen the function that moral factors may play in it."

The principal moral elements . . . . are:  the skill of the commander, the experience and backbone of the troops, and their patriotic spirit.

"An ground forces that maintains its cohesion; . . that cannot be shaken by fears . . ; [that] will non lose the forcefulness to obey orders and its respect and trust for its officers . . ; [that] has been steeled by preparation in privation and endeavour; . . that is mindful of the honor of its artillery—such an army is imbued with the true war machine spirit."

"There are only two sources for this spirit. . . .  The commencement is a series of victorious wars; the second, frequent exertions of the army to the utmost limits of its force."

"In what field of human action is boldness more than at home than in state of war? . . .  It must exist granted a certain power over and above successful calculations involving space, time, and magnitude of forces."

"In state of war more than anywhere else things do not turn out as nosotros expect. . . .  Perseverance in the chosen course is the essential counterweight."

A universal desire is to take the enemy by surprise every bit a means to gain superiority.  Only "information technology is every bit true that past its very nature surprise tin rarely be outstandingly successful. . . .  In strategy surprise becomes more feasible the closer it occurs to the tactical realm, and more difficult, the more than it approaches the higher levels of policy."

"Cunning implies surreptitious purpose. . . .  It is itself a course of cant. . . .  No human characteristic appears then suited to the task of directing and inspiring strategy. . . .  [Yet] the fact remains that these qualities practice non figure prominently in the history of state of war."

"Superiority of numbers is the most common element in victory. . . .  Superiority . . .  can plainly accomplish the point where it is overwhelming. . . .  It thus follows that as many troops equally possible should be brought into the engagement at the decisive point.

"The best strategy is e'er to be very potent; kickoff in general, and so at the decisive point. . . .  In that location is no college and simpler police of strategy than that of keeping one's forces concentrated."

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